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Abstract 
 
Difference-in-Difference (DiD) methods are being increasingly 
used to analyze the impact of mergers on pricing and other 
market equilibrium outcomes. Using evidence from an 
exogenous merger between two retail gasoline companies in a 
specific market in Spain, this paper shows how concentration 
did not lead to a price increase. In fact, the conjectural variation 
model concludes that the existence of a collusive agreement 
before and after the merger accounts for this result, rather than 
the existence of efficient gains. This result may explain 
empirical evidence reported in the literature according to which 
mergers between firms do not have significant effects on prices. 
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1. Introduction
There is no one way to evaluate a merger. Authorizing mergers requires the prediction 
of the participants’ future conduct, which complicates the analysis and gives relative 
importance to the industry’s structure and results during the merger process.
As Weinberg (2008) points out, three main approaches have been used to measure the 
effect of mergers on prices: case studies, simulation of mergers, and direct 
comparisons of prices before and after the process of concentration. The first two 
approaches, however, introduce an array of assumptions that may have a vital impact 
on the outcome of the analysis. As Peters (2006) demonstrates, the results are highly 
sensitive to assumptions about demand, costs and the market’s competitive 
equilibrium.1
Direct before and after comparisons of prices offer a much more flexible framework for 
analysis. For this reason, the number of articles using this approach – the Difference-
in-Difference (DiD) estimator – to analyze the effect of mergers has grown in recent 
years.
The DiD estimator seeks to show the change in the relevant variable (typically price 
levels) in the treatment group (i.e. the market in which firms merge) and in the control 
group (i.e. the market in which firms do not merge). The control group should be as 
similar as possible to the treatment group, both in terms of level of demand and supply 
shocks. The approximation is highly flexible and easy to implement so its application 
has become quite common in the economic literature.
Most of the studies using this methodology conclude that prices increase as a result of 
a merger. Examples of studies reporting significant price hikes include: Barton and 
Sherman (1984) in the microfilm business; Borenstein (1990) and Kim and Singal 
(1993) in the North American air travel market; and McCabe (2002) in the publishing of 
scholarly journals. In the banking sector, Prager and Hannan (1998) and Focarelli and 
Panetta (2003) found that after a merger, savers were rewarded with lower interest 
1 See Budzinski and Ruhmer (2010) for an in-depth explanation of merger simulation models 
and their application to competition policy.
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rates.2 Vita and Sacher (2001) noted that even non-profit hospitals increase prices 
after a process of concentration and Dafny (2009) reported the same outcome with for-
profit hospital mergers. By contrast, Connor, Feldman and Dowd (1998) found cost and 
price reductions after a merger among US hospitals. In rail transport, Karikari, Brown 
and Nadji (2002) also noted reductions in prices, although this result depended on the 
type of goods, direction of traffic, and the type of transport. Ashenfelter and Hosken 
(2008) analyzed the effect of mergers, in terms of prices, on five different industries: 
female hygiene products, alcoholic drinks, lubricating oil, cereals, and breakfast syrups. 
All except breakfast syrups showed significant price increases.3
Although the aforementioned industries show post-merger price increases, the results 
for the gasoline industry differ markedly. Taylor and Hosken (2007) analyzed the effect 
of the Marathon and Ashland petroleum joint venture and reported greater 
concentration and a significant change in the existing vertical market structure. The 
authors concluded, though, that the merger had no significant effects on final retail 
prices. In this same market, Simpson and Taylor (2008) analyzed the effect of the 
merger between Marathon Ashland Petroleum and Ultramar Diamond Shamrock. In 
this case, the authors concluded that the merger, and consequently the market 
concentration, did not create higher market equilibrium prices.4 These results contrast 
with those of Chouinard and Perloff (2007) who, when applying a different 
methodology, noted a positive relationship between merger processes and gasoline 
prices.5
2 Sapienza (2002) reported that the effect on loan contracts depended on the size of the banks 
involved in the merger deal. If the firms had a sizeable market share, interest rates rose; if they 
had a smaller market share, interest rates fell. 
3 See Weinberg (2008) for a more detailed discussion of most of the above studies. 
4 Sen and Townley (2010) evaluated the effects of reductions in outlet density on retail prices 
using Canadian data from 1991-97. A 27% decline in retail outlets led to a 9% increase in retail 
prices. The authors also considered two mergers in this period but reported mixed, and not 
highly statistically significant, impacts on prices.
5 Hastings (2004) reports the change in vertical structure caused by the merger between the 
vertically-integrated company ARCO and the independent, Thrifty gasoline stations. However, 
Taylor, Kreisle and Zimmerman (2007), using a different database, found no significant increase 
in prices. 
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Despite the widespread application of this estimator to measure the effects of mergers, 
it is not without its critics. One of the most notable is the paper by Bertrand et al. 
(2004), in which the authors show how the DiD estimator can present false positives. 
They apply the DiD estimator to examine the effect of invented changes in the labor 
market on female wages and show how the estimator reports positive and significant 
effects in 45 percent of cases, even though there was no real change in the labor 
market. This result shows the bias introduced in data that are serially correlated, so 
that the standard errors are inconsistent in OLS regressions. 
The second major criticism derives from the possible endogeneity in the change in the 
market. If the change to be analyzed by the DiD estimator is not exogenous, the 
estimator will be biased and inconsistent. In the case of mergers it seems clear that the 
decision is not one that is exogenous to the functioning of companies in the market, 
and much less so to their pricing decisions. The endogeneity problem is explained and 
discussed in depth by Dafny (2009).
Finally, we need to take into account the criticisms raised by Simpson and Schmidt 
(2008-2009). In their paper, the authors show that even though the control group 
suffers the same demand and supply shocks as those recorded by the affected group, 
if the two groups incorporated these shocks distinctly, the DiD estimator may be biased 
because they include this difference in the incorporation of demand or supply shocks.
In this paper we examine a new problem in applying the DiD estimator. In this case, the 
problem involves the interpretation of the estimator. The DiD estimator when applied to 
mergers examines whether the level of competition has been reduced and, therefore, 
whether the level of market prices has increased or, by contrast, whether the level of 
competition, and therefore prices, remains unaffected. We show how the results of the 
DiD estimator cannot be used to analyze the level of market competition simply to 
prove a statistical evolution in prices if we know nothing about the reasons underlying 
this trend. To determine how the merger might affect the level of competition in the 
market we have to apply structural models. Recall that the DiD is designed to observe 
if price changes are due to concentration processes. However, companies will not 
necessarily change their pricing levels after a merger, especially if operating in 
perfectly competitive markets or when acting in perfect collusion. For this reason we 
must be cautious in interpreting the results of the Difference-in-Difference estimator 
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when we find no variation in pricing, especially if there are concerns about the degree 
of competition before the merger.
This result is particularly important in the gasoline market where the level of 
competition is often quite far from that of perfect competition (Borenstein and Shepard, 
1996; Delpachitra, 2002; and Perdiguero, 2010). If companies are acting in almost 
perfect collusion, mergers will not result in price increases, which would account for the 
previous empirical outcomes reported in the literature.
By means of illustration, the acquisition of the assets of the multinational petrol 
company, Shell, in the Spanish Canary Islands, by a local petrol company, DISA, 
constitutes a highly interesting case to which to apply the DiD method. On the one 
hand, the presence of monopoly and oligopoly markets in the Canary Islands allows us 
to observe the effect of the merger through the Differences-in-Difference estimator; on 
the other, we can also estimate the impact of the merger using a model of conjectural 
variations.
The econometric results show that the merger has had no significant impact on pricing. 
But the empirical results indicate that a collusive price equilibrium, both before and 
after the concentration process, might account for this outcome. For this reason, in 
highly concentrated markets, where there may be initial problems of competition, price 
changes might not be seen when employing the DiD estimator. In other words, no 
effects are observed on prices because the firms’ conduct was already near that of 
perfect collusion before the merger.
This paper is structured as follows: section 2 outlines DISA’s acquisition of Shell’s 
Spanish assets. In section 3, we present the data used in this analysis. Section 4 
reports the econometric results of the difference estimator, while section 5 analyzes the 
level of competition before and after the merger process using the structural model. 
Finally, the last section (6) draws the paper’s main conclusions.
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2. DISA’s acquisition of Shell’s Spain activities
DISA’s acquisition of Shell’s assets in Spain came about when the multinational had to 
restructure its worldwide operations following financial problems in 2004. On 9 January 
that year, Shell announced a change in its accounting procedures, which reduced the 
value of its petroleum and gas reserves by a fifth or, by approximately four trillion 
barrels of oil. As its reserves are one of the main elements in the economic valuation of 
a company of this type, its stock market value was significantly affected.
Following the resignation of company president, Philip Watts, and an investigation by 
America’s Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the company was fined $120 
million by the American regulator and £17 million by the British regulator. These fines 
were based on the complicity of the company’s upper echelons in the deficient 
accounting of its energy reserves. This was more than apparent in a letter sent by 
Walter Van de Vijver, Head of Exploration and Production, to Philip Watts, the 
Executive President: ‘I am becoming sick and tired about lying’, in a clear reference to
the value of the reserves that the directors knew were overvalued.
This loss of confidence in the company by its investors brought about an internal 
restructuring, both of the company’s governing bodies, and its activities. Included in this 
process was the sale of the retail businesses in Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Cameroon, 
Uruguay and Paraguay. 
The sale of Shell’s retail gasoline business in the Canary Islands had little or nothing to 
do with the workings of the local market. This becomes even more evident if we bear in 
mind that the party most interested in acquiring Shell’s assets at that time should have 
been the dominant player in Spain, Repsol–YPF, which had effectively acquired Shell’s 
assets in Portugal. However, a regulatory order issued by the Spanish Government in 
June 2000 prohibited the acquisition of new gas stations by the dominant players 
during a five-year period.6
The circumstances described above illustrate clearly that the acquisition process can 
be seen as an exogenous change, brought about by an event outside the analyzed 
market. As Dafny (2009) notes, the majority of mergers can be considered endogenous 
6 The Royal Decree 6/2000 was passed on 23 June.
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in nature and, accordingly, he claims that DiD estimates offer biased results since the 
orthogonality condition of natural experiments fails. In the case of DISA’s acquisition of 
Shell’s assets in Spain, however, this potential bias is minimized, which is an 
indispensable condition when studying a concentration process as a natural 
experiment.
As Lafontaine and Slade (2008) point out, the term ‘natural experiment’ refers to an 
analysis that fulfills three conditions: an exogenous change in the market; a group of 
observations affected by the change that we call the treatment group; and finally an 
unaffected group that we call the control group. The differential response between 
these two groups, relative to change, is used in order to identify the effects. This has 
popularized this estimation of casual relationship, which is known as a DiD estimator. 
Simplicity aside, its great advantage is its potential to avoid many of the problems of 
endogeneity that habitually arise when carrying out comparisons among 
heterogeneous individuals (see Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan 2004).
The gasoline market in the Canary Islands is ideal for this analysis. The archipelago 
consists of seven islands, two of which, El Hierro and La Gomera, function under a 
monopoly run by DISA and were unaffected by the merger. In the other five islands, 
Fuerteventura, Gran Canaria, La Palma, Lanzarote and Tenerife, both DISA and Shell 
were present and the islands were affected by the concentration process; they form our 
treatment group. Thus, we can isolate the effect of the merger in our treatment group, 
as we have a control group for comparison.
A second element arising from the DISA and Shell operation was the impact that it had 
on the market, given that these two companies had the largest market shares. In the 
following table we can see these market shares and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI), before and after the merger, in terms of the number of petrol stations on each 
island.
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Table 1: Market shares and HHI before and after the merger
 DISA Shell DISA + 
Shell 
Texaco BP Repsol PCAN Cepsa HHI 
(before) 
HHI 
(after) 
Change 
HHI 
Tenerife 33% 16% 49% 13% 17% 12% 9% 0% 2028 3084 1056 
Gran Canaria 31% 18% 49% 17% 23% 9% 1% 1% 2186 3302 1116 
Lanzarote 46% 21% 67% 11% 7% 8% 7% 0% 2840 4772 1932 
Fuerteventura 37% 24% 61% 19% 0% 10% 10% 0% 2506 4282 1776 
La Palma 42% 31% 73% 11% 11% 5% 0% 0% 2992 5596 2604 
La Gomera 100% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 10000 10000 0 
El Hierro 100% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 10000 10000 0 
Source: Own elaboration
As we can see in Table 1, the acquisition process increased the HHI from 1056 points 
(in the case of Tenerife) to 2604 points (in the case of La Palma). We can assume that 
such a significant increase in the concentration indexes would have had some effect on 
prices. If firms compete in prices or quantities, increasing concentration leads to higher 
equilibrium prices, unless there are efficiency gains. However, during the merger 
process, the companies stated that they did not expect to obtain any efficiency gains. 
As we shall see below, no price changes were observed.
3. Data
The data used here were produced monthly, broken down island by island, and 
covered the period from September 2003 to December 2005. Government 
authorization for the merger of DISA and Shell was obtained after the Spanish antitrust 
authority gave its clearance for the takeover in December 2004. According to Taylor
and Hosken (2007), a year should be sufficient time to observe the effects of a merger 
when only observing its impact on the retail sector, as we do in this paper. The prices 
are the monthly weighted averages for unleaded 95-, 97-, and 98-octane gasoline, by 
island, priced in Euro cents. The total volume sold each month by retailers on each 
island is measured in cubic meters. The breakdown of the data for each grade of 
unleaded gasoline should not affect the analysis, since all the service stations sell the
three gas grades; moreover, the market shares for the companies are similar for all 
types of fuel (see Perdiguero and Jiménez, 2009).
The Rotterdam market’s refined gasoline rates were taken from the annual statistics of 
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and are the average spot 
price for refined 95-octane gasoline, measured in Euro cents per liter. The population 
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headcounts provided by the Instituto Canario de Estadística (Canary Islands Statistics 
Institute) are related to the number of air passengers entering and leaving via the 
Spanish Airports Authority (AENA) installations, which is monitored to control the 
sizeable tourist flows to the islands. Transport costs, expressed in Euro cents per liter, 
were calculated using data published on the National Energy Commission’s website. 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for these variables.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variables Observations Average Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Price 196 66.86 6.94 57.2 82.4 
Quantity 196 9316.16 11546.2 221 32953.9 
Population 196 276455.7 339473.3 10071 838877 
Tourists 196 187882.6 181902.3 843 579963 
New registered cars 196 1165.5 1432.8 14 5492 
Gasoline Spot Price 196 32.51 7.89 21.09 51.77 
Transport Cost 196 1.89 0.39 1.27 2.25 
Source: Own elaboration.
4. The effects of the merger upon prices using the difference estimator
 
As commented previously, the DiD estimator analyzes the impact that a natural 
experiment has upon a treatment group in comparison to a control group that is 
unaffected by the change. In our case, the three conditions for natural experiments as 
defined by Lafontaine and Slade (2008) are fully met. In reality, the merger was not an 
endogenous concentration process that affected the behavior of both market players. 
As outlined in Section 2, it was brought about by Shell’s exit from Spain and by private 
negotiations to sell the company’s assets in the archipelago.
Secondly, we have a treatment group, consisting of the five oligopolistic islands, where 
the merger has affected market concentrations and market shares. Thirdly, the islands, 
La Gomera and El Hierro, on which DISA holds a monopoly, constitute the control 
group as their concentration has not been affected. The control group must, however, 
have the same market structure as that of the affected group. In our case the control 
group is a monopoly, which could modify the shape, for example, of transfer costs. 
Although this might invalidate our control group, we show that the behavior of both 
groups is identical, and so our control group is fully valid.
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We should point out that, like Hastings (2004), we found no significant change in the 
market apart from the merger process itself. There were no new competitors, no new 
services, or products; the service stations did not even change their emblem, because, 
up until 2009, they continued to use the Shell brand name.
The fulfillment of these conditions gives our paper another advantage, as the economic 
framework is identical for the treatment and control groups: i.e., they are 
contemporaries; their taxes were the same before and after the merger; they were 
affected by similar patterns of behavior; etc. Other papers have had to make their 
comparisons with similar markets in which a merger had not taken place. Among 
others, these include: substitutive products in Barton and Sherman’s (1984) study; 
similar routes in the case of Kim and Singal (1993); other states or regions in the 
papers by Simpson and Taylor (2008) and Taylor and Hosken (2007). 
To implement the DiD estimator, we specify the following linear price 
equation:7
0 1 2 3
11
4 5 6
1
_ _
ts ts t ts
h h ts
h
p Q GasolineSpot TransportCost
D structurechange Dif in dif D Oligopoly Month
   
    

    
      
       (1)
where _D structurechange is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if the 
observation was made after the merger and 0 if it took place before the merger. The 
variable _D Oligopoly takes the value of 1 for the islands operating under an oligopoly 
market, and 0 for those operating under a monopoly. Finally, the variable Dif in dif 
is the product of these two structural change dummies. This variable takes a value of 1 
for those observations that correspond to the island under an oligopoly after the 
merger.
Thus, the estimator can be defined as the difference in the average result in the 
treatment group before and after the change minus the difference in the average result 
in the control group before and after the merger.
7 Section 5 includes a more detailed explanation of the terminology of the variables used in the 
analysis.
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In general terms, to improve our results, and especially those of the previous estimator, 
for all the oligopolistic islands, we studied the possibility that the merger increased 
prices differently depending on the island. As we shall see, to control for this effect we 
estimate that the price equation includes the product variable of the island dummy and 
structural change.
0 1 2 3 4
5 11
1 1
_
_ *
ts ts t ts
i i h h ts
i h
p Q GasolineSpot TransportCost D structurechange
D structurechange OligopolyIsland Month
    
  
 
     
   
      (2)
Table 3 presents the estimates for the DiD model, described in equation (1), with an 
ordinary least squares and a two-stage least squares estimation that account for the 
endogeneity of total quantity (Q) using population headcounts, car registrations and 
tourist arrivals as instruments. The statistician Hansen shows us that these instruments 
are not correlated with the error term and, thus, that the instruments are valid. The 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM Statistic reject the null hypothesis that the first stage is 
underidentificated, so our instruments are correct.8
The joint estimation of the model is correct, and shows a goodness of fit between 0.79 
and 0.96. All the significant variables shown are at 1%, except for the oligopoly dummy 
and its corresponding DiD estimator, although note that the period’s fixed effects have 
been excluded from the table. Although the sign is as expected, the non-significance of 
the oligopoly dummy may indicate that the prices on the oligopolistic islands and those 
on the islands under monopoly are not very different, although the dummy is significant 
at the 15% level.9
Equally, the difference estimator is not significant.10
8 Results from the pricing equations without Q as explanatory variables provide similar results.
This indicates that the DISA –
Shell merger has not affected prices on the oligopolistic islands, compared to the price 
9 Problems of multicollinearity are not found between the fixed effects of the month and the spot 
price of gasoline (the correlation ranges from -0.18 to 0.25) or between the fixed effects of 
island and transport costs (the correlation ranges from -0.42 to 0.61).
10 In fact, the report provided for the companies by the Tribunal (Expedient C86-04, footnote 
105) affirms that (...) an increase in prices of less than 0.15% could be expected because of the 
concentration.
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levels on their monopolistic counterparts, and shows the aforementioned estimator’s 
lack of significance.11
The dummy, which gathers the effect that the structural change has had on average 
gasoline prices in the Canaries, indicates that prices increased on all the islands after 
the merger; however, this was not due to the concentration process but rather to a 
series of exogenous factors not included in the model.
 
Table 3: Two-least squares and ordinary-least squares estimates for all oligopolistic 
islands
tsP  2LS 2LS OLS OLS 
Intercept  39.2174** 
(1.4673) 
66.0830** 
(0.5760) 
42.0299** 
(1.1015) 
66.0724** 
(0.6006) 
Dummy Oligopoly  -1.9869 
(1.3273) 
0.8558 
(0.7897) 
1.1439 
(0.7363) 
0.6629 
(0.7660) 
Dummy Merger (Structural change)  2.4129** 
(0.4185) 
11.016** 
(0.8382) 
2.4044** 
(0.4439) 
11.016** 
(0.8724) 
DiD estimator (oligopolistic islands)  -0.1897 
(0.4134) 
-0.1810 
(0.9918) 
-0.1783 
(0.4372) 
-0.1783 
(1.0329) 
tsQ  -0.0001** (0.00002) 
-0.00002 
(0.00002) 
  
Transport Cost  0.7071+ 
(0.3237) 
 -0.0981 
(0.1409) 
 
Spot Rotterdam Price  0.7197** 
(0.0241) 
 0.7203** 
(0.0259) 
 
2Centered R  0.9638 0.7871 0.9619 0.7863 
F-Statistic  473.36** 
(0.0000) 
112.52** 
(0.0000) 
364.05** 
(0.0000) 
116.60** 
(0.0000) 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM Statistic 96.453*** 
(0.0000) 
116.825*** 
(0.0000) 
  
Hansen J Statistic  0.459 
(0.7948) 
2.891 
(0.2357) 
  
+ p<.10. 
* p<.05. 
** p<.01. 
As mentioned above, we repeated the analysis for each island, while taking into 
account the changes in average prices due to the merger. This information is gathered 
in equation (2), through the estimated parameters i .
11 Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan’s (2004) results indicate that the DiD estimator may have a 
bias that leads to the null hypothesis of no effect being rejected when the error term is 
autocorrelated. While our results may also suffer from this bias, it would strengthen our findings 
that the merger has not had any significant effect on prices, even though autocorrelation might 
lead to such an effect being detected incorrectly. 
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The corresponding estimations are included in Table 4, and were carried out applying 
the same methodologies as in the previous estimation. As before, the joint significance 
of the model is correct, as the goodness of fit is high (between 0.79 and 0.96), and all 
the estimated variables are significant at 1% or 5%, except those corresponding to the 
DiD estimator for the islands. Here again the instruments used do not appear to be 
correlated to the error term, which is precisely what is shown by the Hansen Statistic 
and Kleibergen-Paap rk LM Statistic.
The conclusion is, therefore, the same. The merger did not increase prices on the 
islands under oligopoly (not even in a detailed study at the island level), but prices did 
increase for the whole post-merger period on all the islands. Borenstein (1990) 
reported that prices increase equally on all air routes, not just those affected by the 
merger. He believes that one explanation could be the greater facility to collude. 
However, the suggestion is that this is not the case here as there is nothing to indicate 
that the merger would have facilitated collusion, since it did not increase multimarket 
contact or cross-ownership. 
Here, the vertical disintegration required by the Spanish Competition Authority in order 
for the merger to be accepted, may have led to the price increase. Before the merger, 
DISA had a vertical integration agreement with a refinery in Tenerife, owned by CEPSA 
(a separate company). The fact that DISA petrol stations became vertically 
disintegrated may account for this price increase in all markets (oligopolies and 
monopolies) after the merger. There is considerable empirical evidence of how vertical 
disintegration generates price increases in the market due to a double-marginalization 
process (Barron and Umbeck, 1984; Shepard, 1993; Blass and Carlton, 1999; Vita, 
2000; and Bello and Cavero, 2008). If there is no strong competition in either segment 
of the industry, the disintegration process may lead to higher equilibrium prices. 
Although vertical disintegration could be one explanation for the general price increase, 
it is not the aim of this paper to analyze the effect of vertical relationships in the 
gasoline market.
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Table 4: Two-least squares and ordinary least-squares estimates for individual island 
oligopolies 
 
tsP  2LS 2LS OLS OLS 
Intercept  39.3390** 
(1.5834) 
66.0839** 
(0.5746) 
42.1719** 
(1.1455) 
66.0724** 
(0.6051) 
Dummy Oligopoly  -1.8210 
(1.5248) 
0.8720 
(0.8441) 
1.3388 
(0.8422) 
0.6629 
(0.7746) 
Dummy Merger (Structural change)  2.4129** 
(0.4182) 
11.0163** 
(0.8382) 
2.4044** 
(0.4478) 
11.016** 
(0.8821) 
DiD Gran Canaria  0.0181 
(0.5876) 
0.0769 
(1.2715) 
0.0159 
(0.6236) 
-0.1033 
(1.2848) 
DiD Tenerife  -0.2632 
(0.6019) 
-0.3819 
(1.3391) 
-0.5205 
(0.6352) 
-0.6640 
(1.2806) 
DiD Fuerteventura  -0.3955 
(0.6219) 
-0.1098 
(1.2494) 
0.0152 
(0.6304) 
0.0542 
(1.2704) 
DiD La Palma  -0.3317 
(0.6241) 
-0.7204 
(1.2532) 
-0.7284 
(0.6450) 
-0.5437 
(1.2674) 
DiD Lanzarote  0.0241 
(0.6089) 
0.2291 
(1.2399) 
0.3263 
(0.6309) 
0.3653 
(1.2741) 
tsQ  -0.00006* (0.00003) 
-0.00002 
(0.00003) 
  
Transport Cost  0.6730+ 
(0.3724) 
 -0.1378 
(0.1629) 
 
Spot Rotterdam Price  0.7197** 
(0.0240) 
 0.7203** 
(0.0260) 
 
2Centered R  0.9640 0.7879 0.9628 0.7872 
F-Statistic  401.78** 
(0.0000) 
90.47** 
(0.0000) 
338.98** 
(0.0000) 
93.44** 
(0.0000) 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM Statistic 54.523*** 
(0.0000) 
66.917*** 
(0.0000) 
  
Hansen J Statistic  0.495 
(0.7806) 
2.216 
(0.3454) 
  
+ p<.10. 
* p<.05. 
** p<.01. 
 
We note that the control group in our DiD estimator, the monopolistic islands, has a 
completely different market structure to that of the affected group, the islands under 
oligopoly. According to Simpson and Schmidt (2008-2009), this can mean that supply 
and demand shocks are incorporated differently in the two groups. In turn, the DiD 
estimator might not show the effect of the merger correctly as the effect of this 
difference in transmission is also incorporated within the DiD estimator. In the next 
section we show why we believe that the choice of monopolistic islands as a control 
group is appropriate and does not bias our DiD estimator.
To test the validity of our control group we follow the methodology used by Albalate 
(2008): we estimated the same models incorporating dummy variables for years prior 
to the merger, differentiated for the islands affected and unaffected by the merger and 
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eliminating the variables of the DiD estimator. The econometric result indicates that 
both groups followed the same trend before the merger (with a probability of 0.7951
that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the two dummy variables are equal), so the 
result of the difference-in-difference estimator would reflect the specific effect of the 
merger and not the previous evolution of both groups.
The DiD estimator indicates that the merger did not affect the average final prices of 
gasoline in the Canaries. Prices have increased on all the islands, but for reasons 
unrelated to the merger. This result may seem surprising as it does not fit with the 
predictions of the classical theoretical models. This was a merger that greatly elevated 
market concentration and in which companies did not reap any efficiency gains, so the 
equilibrium price should have increased. However, there is a logical explanation; if, 
before the concentration process, the companies had reached a price agreement that 
approached perfect collusion, then the merger process could not increase prices that 
were already at the joint maximization level of profits. If the price increase observed on 
all the islands was caused by double marginalization, it would have caused this to 
occur.
In the next section we analyze the level of competition in the Canary Islands’ gasoline 
market, using a conjectural variation model for the pre- and post-merger periods.
 
 
5. Analysis of the level of competition using a conjectural variation model
This second analysis of the DISA-Shell merger is based on the assumption that the 
consumer surplus depends on the prices of all the companies operating in the market. 
We use oligopolistic models that can predict the competitors’ reaction (see Weinberg, 
2008). Despite criticisms raised by Corts (1999), conjectural variation models have 
been used on numerous occasions to estimate the competitive behavior of the market. 
Specifically, Coloma (2002) used this methodology to analyze the effect of the merger 
between the Spanish and Argentine oil companies Repsol and YPF, respectively, and 
observed less competitive behavior after the merger, which might explain the higher 
equilibrium prices.
The theoretical development of the conjectural variation model here is in line with 
Parker and Röller (1997), Fageda (2006) and Puller (2007). More recently Perdiguero 
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and Jiménez (2009) offer a detailed description of the methodology employed. As in 
the aforementioned study, we analyze gasoline as a homogeneous good, by assuming 
that the consumers choose between the different brands available rather than between 
the different service stations.
Moreover, the Canary Islands’ market presents certain characteristics that make the 
bias obtained by this assumption less restrictive. We know that: i) the various 
companies operating offer similar services; ii) the locations taken by the companies on 
highways (which are scarce in the Canaries) and in urban and inter-urban areas are 
very similar; iii) only in one out of eighty-eight municipalities in oligopolistic islands is 
served by a single company; and finally iv) during the last decade, the representation of 
the brands has remained stable. Given the aforementioned, the pre- and post-merger 
competition analysis will be carried out using average terms for the island markets.
The generic conjectural variation model has the following characteristics. Let us 
assume that companies face the following demand function:12
1
,
SN
ts its ts
i
p f q Z

 	
 
 
 
 , (3)
that is to say, the average price that the companies fix in moment t in market s (in our 
case each island is a market). Pts depends on the summation of the quantity sold by 
each company (i=1,…Ns) in moment t on island s 1
SN
its
i
q

 	

 
 

, as well as a series of 
known exogenous factors grouped into tsZ .
The cost function of each of the companies is expressed as:  
 ,vcits its its itsC F C q   (4)
where the symbols represent the following: total company costs i in moment t in market 
s, the sum of a fixed cost  itsF , and a variable cost  
vcC
. These variable costs 
depend on the quantity the company has sold  itsq and on a series of exogenous and 
known factors given by  its .
12 The building of the structural model is fully summarized in Perdiguero and Jiménez (2009).
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In this way, the function that maximizes each company is equal to:
                     
 
1
, , ,
S
its
N
vc
q its ts its ts its its its its
i
Max p q Z q F C q 

 	
   
 
 

                             (5)
where the first order equilibrium condition depends on the following expression: 
                          
     . . . 0ts its ts its
ts
p
q p CM
Q


  
                                           (6)
The symbols represent the following: tsQ the total quantity sold in moment t and on 
island s, and  .itsMC is the marginal cost of each company during a given period and 
on a given island. That is to say:  
vc
its
its
CMC
q



The parameter  ts is determined by the variation in the quantity offered by the other 
companies  j i , when company i varies its own supply, which is normally referred to 
in the literature as conjectural variation. Depending on the variation, we will achieve 
perfect competition  0ts  , the Cournot model  1ts  or a monopoly  ts sN  .
The relative assumption that the companies are totally symmetrical and equal in their 
strategic behavior on each island, or market, implies equality in the conjectural 
variation parameter for all the firms. Thus, by breaking down all the companies, island 
by island, and assuming equality in marginal costs, we obtain the following expression: 
                                
     . . . 0,   ts ts ts ts
ts
p
Q p MC i
Q


   
                                           (7)
where 
ts
ts
sN
 
measures the average conduct parameter. The parameter ranges 
between 0 and 1, and its significance is the following: 0ts  is perfect competition; 
1
ts
sN
 
is Cournot-style competitive behavior, and 1ts  is perfect collusion.
To implement empirically the theoretical model described above, and bearing in mind 
the symmetry between the companies island by island, we use the following non-linear 
demand function:
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                                                 (8)
where log tsQ is the logarithm of the total quantity sold by the companies on island s in 
moment t depending on the average price that has been fixed ( tsp ); the variable tsPop
measures the number of inhabitants on each island in a year; the number of air 
passenger arrivals is tsTurists ; and the number of cars registered is Re tsgister . We 
have also introduced dummy variables, by island and by month, which allow us to
explain each island’s peculiarities as regards consumption, as well as the seasonality 
of that consumption.
If we transfer the previous demand function to the equilibrium of model equation (7), we 
can simplify the latter to:
                                       
 
1
. 0ts ts ts tsp MC
 

   
                                          (9)
where tsMC is explained by the following equation:
11
0 1 2 3 4
1
ts ts t ts t h h ts
h
MC Q GasolineSpot TransportCost Time Month      

      
(10)
where the marginal cost of the companies, located on island s at moment t  tsMC ,
depends on: the quantity sold on island s, in moment t; the spot price for refined 95-
octane gasoline on the Rotterdam market for that month ( tGasolineSpot ); the transport 
costs for each of the islands ( tsTransportCost ); and a seasonal trend that groups 
possible increases or decreases in the other marginal cost factors. Finally, we include a 
monthly dummy variable that groups the seasonal differences in marginal costs.
If we introduce marginal costs into equation (9), we obtain:
11
0 1 2 3 4
1 1
ts
ts ts t ts t h h ts
h
p Q GasolineSpot TransportCost Time Month       

       
(11)
If we assume that the conduct parameter of the two islands with a monopoly market is 
equal to 1, in the period prior to the merger (
M
before =1), the previous equation can be 
rewritten as follows:
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0 1 2 3 4
11
1 1 1 1 1
ts ts t ts t
M M M O O O O
before after after before before after after
h h ts
h
p Q GasolineSpot TransportCost Time
D D D D
Month
    
  
 
   
     
     
(12)
where 
M
beforeD ,
M
afterD ,
O
beforeD and
O
afterD are dummy variables that take the value of 1 for 
the islands with monopolies and with oligopolies before and after the merger. The 
constant terms of the islands with monopolies and with oligopolies are determined by 
the following expressions:
0
1
1M
beforeco  
  0
1
M
afterM
afterco



 
0
1
O
beforeO
beforeco



  0
1
O
afterO
afterco



 
In order to identify the constant term adequately, as indicated by Fageda (2006), we 
must add and subtract the terms 1
M
afterD
 , 1
O
beforeD
 and 1
O
afterD
 from the price equation, 
which leaves us with the following:
11
0 1 2 3 4
1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
ts ts t ts t h h
h
M M M O O O O
before after after before before after after
M M O O O O
after after before before after after
t
p Q GasolineSpot TransportCost Time Month
D D D D
D D D D D D
     
  
   

     

      
    
      

s
(13)
As such, the price equation can be reformulated as follows:
1 2 3 4
11
1 2 3
1
ts ts t ts t
M O O
h h after before after ts
h
p co Q GasolineSpot TransportCost Time
Month D D D
   
    

     
    
     (14)
where
1
1
1 Mafter


  2
1
1 Obefore


  3
1
1 Oafter


  
and
0
1
1co 

 
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With this specification we can estimate the conduct parameters for the islands with 
monopolies after the merger process (
M
after ) and for the islands with oligopolies before 
and after the merger (
O
before and 
O
after ). They are provided by the following expressions: 
 1 11Mafter   
 2 11Obefore   
 3 11Oafter   
The results derived from these parameters indicate whether the two island monopolies 
effectively behaved as such in the period after the merger. However, the parameters of 
the island oligopolies reveal behavioral differences before and after the merger 
process, when compared to those of the islands with monopolies. They also indicate 
whether there was any behavioral change, due to the merger process, on the islands 
under oligopoly.13
Table 5 shows the estimation of the simultaneous equations (8) and (14) using non-
linear, three-stage least squares. As can be seen, almost all the variables included are 
significant, at least at 5%, and they include the dummies needed to obtain the 
parameter before and after the merger process for the islands under oligopoly. The 
dummy variable, which indicates the post-merger parameter on the islands with 
monopolies, is not significant. This indicates that there is no significant difference in the 
behavior of the islands under monopoly conditions, both before and after the merger. 
As for the demand equation, we can observe how the price variable is negative and 
significant at 1%. It shows an average elasticity of demand equal to -0.46, which is very 
similar to published empirical evidence (see Dahl and Sterner, 1991). Equally we can 
observe how both population and tourists positively affect the quantities sold, whereas 
the number of registrations does not appear to be significant. This is probably due to 
the fact that this variable does not include the scrapping of vehicles, which contains a 
strong cyclical element; this effect was previously included in the estimation in the fixed 
effects of time.
13 We introduced a cluster by island to take into account the fact that the error term could be 
different on each island. Our results remained constant however.
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In the price equation, we can see how the international wholesale price and the 
transport costs increase the marginal cost, and consequently the market price. Note 
that there seem to be small scale economies within the marginal cost, as the variable 
of quantity is negative and significant at 1%.
Table 5: Non-linear, three-stage least squares estimate
 Coefficient  Z-Student  
Intercept  6.315** 
(0.144) 
43.95 
(0.000) 
tsP  -0.007** 
(0.002) 
-3.56 
(0.000) 
tsPopulation  9.15-e06** 
(0.000) 
8.54 
(0.000) 
tsTourists  1.40e-06** 
(0.000) 
5.43 
(0.000) 
tsNew Registered Cars  0.00002 
(0.00004) 
0.39 
(0.697) 
2R   0.99 
2Chi   22392.63** 
(0.0000) 
tsEndogenous Variable =P    
Intercept  44.032** 
(0.000) 
36.42 
(0.000) 
M
AfterD  0.079 (0.418) 
0.19 
(0.851) 
O
BeforeD  -2.335* (1.022) 
-2.29 
(0.022) 
O
AfterD  -2.431* (1.069) 
-2.27 
(0.023) 
tsQ  -0.00007** (0.00002) 
-4.02 
(0.000) 
tSpot Rotterdam  0.444** (0.031) 
14.14 
(0.000) 
tTransport Cost  0.796** (0.245) 
3.25 
(0.001) 
tTime  0.390** (0.036) 
10.84 
(0.000) 
2R   0.98 
2Chi   8478.05** 
(0.000) 
+ p<.10.
* p<.05.
** p<.01.
 
When applying the formulae to obtain the different conduct parameters, the results 
initially indicate that the behavior of the island monopolies did not vary throughout the 
period. We would therefore expect a value equal to one, which is monopoly equilibrium. 
Likewise, the behavior of the islands oligopolies is close to perfect collusion. With a 
figure of 5%, it is not possible to reject such behavior, either before or after merger, but 
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with a value of 0.98 (
before
O  after
O  0.98
). This result is not surprising. The economic 
literature has reported evidence of tacit collusion in the gasoline retailing market 
before; see, for example, Eckert and West’s (2005) analysis of the city of Vancouver.
Moreover, we cannot statistically reject the idea that both parameters may be equal. As 
discussed above, insofar as the behavior of both groups (control and affected) is the 
same, the monopoly islands represent a suitable control group in the difference-in-
difference estimator. Simpson and Schmidt (2008-2009) identified the problems 
generated by the presence of different market structures in the control and treatment 
groups, which  results in differences in the transmission of demand and supply shocks 
to the DiD estimator. In our case, although this difference in market structure exists and 
it might bias the DiD estimator, the fact that the markets behave in a similar fashion 
means our control group is suitable.14
Table 6: Conduct parameters before and after the merger
Parameters Coefficient Z-Student 
M
after   1.00  
 0Mafter    120758.99** (0.000) 
 1Mafter    0.04 (0.8509) 
O
before   0.98  
 0Obefore    13866.89** (0.000) 
 1/ 6 0.16Obefore     9723.66** (0.000) 
 1Obefore    3.70
+ 
(0.0543) 
O
after   0.98  
 0Oafter    12690.85** (0.000) 
 1/ 5 0.2Oafter     8896.69** (0.000) 
 1Oafter    3.68
+ 
(0.0552) 
O O
before after    0.07 (0.7892) 
+ p<.10. 
* p<.05. 
** p<.01. 
14 Corts (1999) shows how the conduct parameter method can underestimate the degree of 
market power if firms are involved in dynamic efficient collusion. In our case, the conduct 
parameter is near the monopoly level so if this bias exists it has only a very slight effect on our 
estimates. Various studies, including Puller (2009), propose different methodologies to solve 
this bias. Unfortunately they require firm-level data which we do not have access to.
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What are the implications of our result? The DiD estimator is designed to show 
changes in prices, not changes in the level of market competition. When dealing with 
mergers in potentially non-competitive markets, including those that result in high 
concentrations and which do not generate efficiency gains, it is logical price changes 
will not be observed. In this case, firms collude before and after the concentration 
process and so optimal prices are not altered. Therefore, the Competition Authority’s 
decision to give its approval to a merger in a collusive market is correct if we focus 
solely on its unilateral effects. However, in collusive markets, the authorities should not 
assess the likely impact on pricing, but rather the multilateral effects of the merger on 
sustaining collusion.
This result is especially important for the gasoline retail market since the literature has 
reported empirical evidence of collusion. Likewise, our result helps explain why the DiD 
estimator finds positive effects of mergers in prices in all markets except that of 
gasoline. The difference in the level of competition would seem to account for the 
difference in behavior. 
6. Conclusions
The economic analysis of mergers is one of the most complex tasks in antitrust 
enforcement since it does not analyze what has occurred in the market, but rather what 
may occur. Moreover, mergers can have contradictory effects for consumers. On the 
one hand, they may generate improvements in efficiency that can be translated into 
lower prices. On the other hand, the elimination of a competitor may lead to the 
exercise of market power (unilateral effects) or even to collusion being more effectively 
sustained (multilateral effects).
One methodology adopted in examining the effect of mergers is the implementation of 
natural experiments, especially using the DiD estimator. To implement this, we need an 
exogenous change in the market, a control group that remains unaffected by the 
change, and a group affected by the change. With this methodology we can see how 
the change affects the market, bearing in mind that the control group is untouched by 
this change. The majority of articles that apply this methodology to analyze the effect 
on prices of concentration processes report significant price increases, the exception 
being the research conducted to date in the gasoline market.
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The application of this methodology to the retail gasoline market in the Canary Islands 
shows us that the merger between DISA and Shell has not significantly affected retail 
prices. This result may seem surprising as they had previously been the two leading 
companies in terms of their respective market shares. Although the unilateral effects of 
the merger do not increase prices, the elimination of an operator makes it easier to 
reach the collusive agreements that seem to exist in the market. Therefore, accepting 
the merger does not seem a good idea; on the contrary, encouraging the entry of more 
operators to increase competition would appear to be the best option.
One reason for this result is the lack of competition in the markets. This means that, 
after the merger was completed, prices did not rise as they were already fixed at the 
joint maximum profit; i.e., perfect monopolistic equilibrium. To test this possibility, we 
implemented a conjectural variation model that, due to the characteristics of the 
gasoline market in the Canary Islands, permitted us to observe empirically the 
behavioral difference between the islands with monopolies and those with oligopolies; 
additionally, it enabled us to study possible behavioral changes in the latter group 
following the merger. 
The econometric results show that we cannot reject the idea that the average behavior 
of the companies operating in the oligopolistic markets is monopolistic, either before or 
after the merger. The retail gasoline prices in the Canary Islands have remained 
unaffected by the DISA-Shell merger because, prior to the merger, prices maximized 
joint profits and because of this, the new company had no incentive to increase prices. 
If we analyze the Competition Authority’s decision only from the standpoint of unilateral 
effects, the decision to accept the merger can be considered correct. Increasing market 
concentration was not detrimental to consumers. However, if we take multilateral 
effects into account, it seems that the Antitrust Authority should have examined in 
greater depth the impact of the disappearance of a competitor on the maintenance of a 
collusive agreement. This recommendation is essential for the gasoline market 
because the empirical literature reports evidence of non-competitive behavior in this 
industry. In fact the non-competitive behavior of this industry might explain why the DiD 
estimator invariably finds positive effects of mergers on prices except in the gasoline 
market.
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